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~ IN THE SUPREME COURT

I

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL R. MELLEN,
i
Plaintiff and Appellant, !

I

vs.

1

Case No.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
10795
UTAH, UTAH RICHARDSON \'.
ROOFING and THE STATE .
INSURANCE FUND,
;
Defendants and Respondents. !
I

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a claim before the Industrial Commission
of the State of Utah for disability by reason of a heart
condition claimed to have been aggravated while performing the work of a self-employed roofer.
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL
COlVIMISSION
The matter was heard by the Industrial Commission and referred to a lVIedical Panel. The Medical
1

Panel filed its report with the Industrial Commission,
finding that the applicant did not sustain an injury
as alleged which could be considered as an industrial
accident. The Industrial Commission adopted the report and denied plaintiff's claim.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the order of the Industrial Commission and the granting of his claim.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Commission on September 22, 1965, for a disability incurred
while performing roofing work on June 23, 1965.
(R. 3).
Plaintiff testified that he has been a roofing con·
tractor in the Salt Lake City area since 1947. He testified that he is the sole owner and proprietor of Utah
Richardson Roofing. Plaintiff, at the time of the incident of June 23, 1965, was 55 years of age. (R. 15).
He testified that prior to June 23, 1965, he had never
seen a doctor for any type of a heart condition, and
that there were no prior heart complaints. (R. 27-29).
He testified that on June 23, 1965, he was finishing
up a roofing job on the roof of the Aix La Chappelle
Apartments in the area of 2240 East 4800 South.
(R. 16). He stated that he started on the job at approxi-
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mately 7 :00 A.M. in the morning and was working at
a faster rate than usual in an attempt to finish so that
he could collect his pay. ( R. 24) . He testified that the
work was extremely arduous and that he felt that he
oyerdid it physically that morning. Also, he testified that
during the entire week he ·was in a state of nervous tension hoping to finish the job as soon as possible. (R. 24,
25) . Plaintiff described the details of the work as requiring him to make trips up and down a ladder carrying
buckets of roofing cement and the details of finishing up
the work around chimneys, which entailed chiseling out
mortar and nailing cement nails with a 6-pound hammer,
and part of the time having to get on his knees in
order to hammer the nails; that this was extremely
arduous labor. He stated that between 10 :00 and
11 :00 A.M. he was working on a chimney and was
driving cement nails with the hammer, when he experienced "extreme pain" in his high upper chest. He described the pain as severe and testified that he experienced unusual perspiration; that this caused him to
have to quit his work and sit down in the shade of the
chimney for ten to fifteen minutes. (R. 18). After sitting down for ten to fifteen minutes, he resumed his work
until noon when he had lunch. ( R. 19) . He finished
work at approximately 3:00 P.M., and while driving
back to his shop experienced another pain in the same
area of his chest. ( R. 20) . After arriving home he
cleaned up and sat in an easy chair until dinnertime;
and when he sat down to the table for dinner, he was
struck hard with pain; and his speech was incoherent,
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due to a tightness in his throat. His wife called Dr.
Trowbridge. She then took him to the St. Mark's Hospital at the suggestion of Dr. Trowbridge. Plaintiff
also experienced a numb and stinging pain in his arms
and passed out after arriving at the hospital. (R. 22).
Dr. Behrens treated plaintiff at the hospital during
his stay of approximately three weeks. Dr. Behrens
testified that plaintiff had suffered an occlusion of the
anterior coronary vessel which resulted in destruction
of muscle on the anterior surface of the heart, which
was replaced by scar tissue. ( R. 88) .
The Panel agrees with the diagnosis of arteriosclerotic heart disease, with coronary thrombosis, with
anterior myocardial infarction of the anterior wall of
the heart. ( R. 46) .
]\fr. Mellen testified concernmg complaints of

chest pains during the few days prior to the incident
of June 23, 1965, and stated (R. 26) that during the
first part of the week he had experienced slight pains,
which he felt to be gas pains and that they had not
been severe enough to cause him to stop working. He
stated that he experienced these pains while working
on the same roofing job. (R. 26, 27). On further questioning in a later hearing, plaintiff testified in more
detail concerning the pains prior to June 23. He testified that the first pain he had was while performing
heavy work on the same job on approximately June
19, at which time he also experienced perspiration anrl
stopped for a short time, and that the very first time
4

that he felt pain was while he was working on this same
roofing job. (R. 75, 76). Dr. Behrens testified as to
the history which Mr. Mellen gave him at the hospital
as follows, (R. 89):
"At that time he stated that over a period of
two to three days prior to the 23d he had noted
some anterior chest pain of a squeezing nature,
which seemed to radiate into his arms. This would
occur with exertion, and when he would stop
and rest it would stop. It was particularly
severe he said on the day before he came in-or
the day of admission, during the daytime-since
he was admitted in the evening. When he was
finishing up the job and was pounding cement
nails, he found that this amount of exertion
caused his chest pain to come on rather rapidly
and quite severely, and he would have to stop
pounding for a period of time. It would subside,
and then recur again when he would attempt to
pound them."
The Panel report in relating the history at R. 47
states in part as follows:
"Furthermore the historical information is
plainly indicative that he had chest pain typical
of coronary arterial sclerosis from about 6-1965, which would be five days preceding the day
of his alleged injury on 6-23-65. He relates an
attack of very severe chest pain during the night
of 6-21-65 when after supper approximately nine
p.m., his angina! pain was so severe that he took
medication containing codein for the relief of
pain. This would tend to indicate that he had
symptoms directly related to his heart disease
before the date of the alleged injury."
5

It should be noted that there is no substantiation

in the record for the above statement as to a severe attack on June 21, 1965. Plaintiff testified under oath on
two occasions, and the only incident at home which he
mentioned was the one on June 23, 1965, immediately
prior to being taken to the hospital. In any event, plaintiff testified that the prior pains which were not as
severe as the one on June 23, were also pains that he
experienced while working on the same roofing job.

After testifying that l\!Ir. l\'Iellen is disabled from
going on with the roofing business ( R. 88), and after
being asked to assume hypothetical facts concerning
the events of June 23, 1965, and for some few days
prior thereto, and the history that was furnished by Mr.
Mellen, Dr. Behrens was asked if he had an opinion
as to whether or not the activities on the job that Mr.
Mellen described precipitated the condition that he
found him to be suffering from.
Dr. Behrens stated (R. 93):
"I do feel that the exertion which he carried
on during that day hastened the onset of the
ultimate situation."
And in further explanation, the following questions
and answers occurred ( R. 93) :
MR. BLACK: "Q And what was the preexisting underlying condition that he had?
A This would have to be-I can't state this defidefinitely in terms of pathology or anatomy,
but it would have to be narrowing of the coro-
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nary arteries, or this particular coronary artery in particular.
Q And this is a condition, as I understand it,
that develops gradually over a long period
of time usually?

A As far as we know, it does, yes.
Q But as I understand your answer, a person
can be gping along with the underlying condition, and not be disabled until an event
happens where the condition of the myocardial infarction is preci pi ta ted?

A That's correct.

Q And is that your opinion of what happened
in this particular case?
A Yes."
On further questioning on cross examination, the
following answers occurred: (R. 98).
" (Mr. Moore) Now you have testified, in regards to Mr. Black's hypothetical, that the
activities of the job is what hastened the onset?

A Yes.
Q What particular activities?

A I think the heavy physical exertion.
Q All right. How about worry? Could that have
hastened it?

A I think it very possibly could.

Q How about the stress of the necessity of getting the job done?
7

A Very possibly. However, the pain came on in
relation to the exertion. Physical exertion.
Q 'Vell, how do you know? If he was worrying
about it, how do you know that the pain came
on because of the physical exertion, or the
worry?

A

vV ell, because when he stopped working the
pain disappeared again."

The panel report stated in part as follows: (R. 47)
"The panel members have agreed that the
situation of overwork, anxiety related to financial reverses, etc. should not be a factor in considering an industrial accident. As was stated
by the patient he was working under stress attempting to finish the job he was doing in order
that payment could be received. The actual work
he was doing was no different than he had been
accustomed to for a number of years. Hence the
situation as it was, with his pain in the chest
occurring long before the day of the alleged
injury, would tend to indicate that he had a
natural evolution of a degenerative process in his
heart, which culminated in an attack of pain and
apparent collapse on or about seven p.m. while
at home on the night of 6-23-65.
"'Vith this evidence before us, and all factors
being considered, the panel members cannot
assume and cannot decide that the applicant sustained an injury, as alleged, which could be considered as an industrial accident on 6-23-65. It
is agreed that the applicant's present disability
due to heart disease cannot be considered to be
of industrial origin."
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On examination of Dr. Elmer Kilpatrick, the
Chairman of the Panel, the following occurred in part:
(R. 65).
"A Do I understand your question clearly, in
that you want me to answer whether his work
produced the pain?
Q

~Thether the work activities that he described
to you had any connection at all with the pain,
or the symptoms that he described?

A Oh, sure they did.
Q What was that?
A Well, as I have stated before here, he would
work, develop pain, rest, the pain would subside, he'd continue working, and so on through
the afternoon."
And the following, (R. 66):
"A Well, that is true. But the pain itself does
not necessarily mean that an actual heart attack has happened. The pain factor just
means that it's a warning to him that he is
exceeding his heart capability, until he gets
an actual infarction, or the narrowing of the
blood vessels becomes so great that he can
have progression of his natural evolution of
disease without actually having a heart attack.
Q 'Vell, what can happen then if he disregards
the warning, the pain that he gets, and continues on working?
A Well, either the pain gets so bad that he can't
go, or he develops a state of overpowering
weakness and collapses.
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Q And can he, in a situation like that, develop
a myocardial infarction?

A Yes, sir.

Q 'Vouldn't you agree that this is the type of
thing that could have happened in this sitution here, with Mr. Mellen?

A It could have."
Plaintiff's claim was denied by order of the Industrial Commission dated November 14, 1966. Plaintiff
filed a petition for rehearing which was denied on November 25, 1966. Plaintiff thereafter filed his petition
for writ of certiorari to appeal the order of the Industrial Commission denying his claim.
POINT I
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
'VAS CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE.
The denial of plaintiff's claim by the Medical Panel
is based on incorrect interpretations of law by the Panel
and is contrary to the undisputed evidence.
In the first place, the Panel states that the situation
of overwork, anxiety related to financial conditions,
financial reverses, etc., should not be a factor in considering an industrial accident. The fallacy of this is
obvious. Certainly, evidence such as this in addition to
a situation where an applicant is engaged in strenuous
physical labor cannot be overlooked as part of the fad
10

situation. Also, we refer to the cases too numerous to
mention where overwork has precipitated the disability
or death resulting in an award.
The Panel goes on to mistakenly assume that an
applicant must show unusual exertion as a cause of the
mJury. The Panel states:
"The actual work he was doing was no different than he had been accustomed to for a number
of years. Hence the situation as it was with his
pain in the chest occurring long before the day
of the alleged injury, would tend to indicate that
he had a natural evolution of a degenerative
process in his heart, which culminated in an
attack of pain and apparent collapse on or about
seven p.m. while at home on the night of 6-2365."

The above statements show that the Panel has
ignored the undisputed evidence in this case, that a period of only a few days was involved from the onset of
the pains which were slight in the beginning to the
severe pains on June 23, 1965, while pounding cement
nails. The foregoing statement also ignores the fact
that the prior occasions when pain was experienced
were connected with the same work that applicant was
doing at the time of the incident on June 23, 1965.
The evidence was undisputed that Daniel Mellen
had never experienced chest pains prior to the few
days before June 23, 1965. The evidence is undisputed
that the pains which he did experience to a lesser degree
the few days before June 23, 1965, and the more pro-
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nounced and severe pain on June 23, were all experienced in connection with the work that he was doing
on the roofing job. On top of this, Dr. Behrens testified
unqualifiedly that in his opinion the exertions of the
job precipitated the underlying condition to a symptomatic point resulting in his present disability. This
undisputed testimony brings the case within the language of Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:

" * * * on account of any accident or injury
or death, in any way contracted, sustained,
aggravated, or incurred by such employee in the
course of or because of or arising out of his employment." (Italics ours).
Opposed to this undisputed evidence, the Panel
report contains misconceptions of law and misstatements of fact. The report totally ignores the undisputed
testimony that the pain started with the exertions of
the work. The denial by the Panel appears to be based
on the unusual exertion rule which was abolished by
the case of Purity Biscuit Company, et al., v. The Industrial Commisson, et al., ( 1949) 115 Utah 1, 201
P.2d 961. Since the holding in the Purity Biscuit Company case, the law in Utah has been concerned with the
simple proposition as to whether or not the exertion,
whether it be unusual or usual, caused the injury in
question. The Industrial Commission in adopting the
Panel report has ignored this case and the later Utah
cases which followed it. The Court stated in the Purity
Biscuit Company case, at page 19:

12

"There is nothing in the statute which requires
or authorizes us to deny compensation merely
because the same type of accident might have
happened at a time or place where the employee
was not acting in the course of his employment.
Nor is there any other reason or justification for
us so holding."
This Court in the Purity Biscuit Company case
held that an award was justified where the evidence
showed that the precipitating act was merely the act
of pushing down on the clutch and letting it out in
driving a truck. The activities in the case at bar consisted of exertion on a roofing job which caused the
chest pain and other symptoms which resulted in the
heart attack and resulting disability. Opposed to the
direct testimony of Dr. Behrens is the speculation indulged in by the Medical Panel that the heart attack
was merely the natural evolution of a degenerative
process in the heart. The Panel has totally ignored the
command of the statute that allows recovery where the
exertion of the job precipitates or hastens the onset
of the underlying condition from nondisabling to disabling.
The case of Jones, et al., v. California Packing
Corporation (1952) 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, is
clear authority for reversing denial of an award when
contrary to the undisputed evidence. That case involved
death from coronary occlusion occurring after exertion
on the job by the husband of claimant. After stating
the well-settled principle which has been ignored by the
Industrial Commission in the case at bar that:
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"It is settled beyond question that a pre-existing disease or other disturbed condition or defect
of the body when aggravated or lighted up by
an industrial accident is compensable under the
act, * * * (page 615).
the Court proceeded b· examine the medical evidence
in the record. The plaintiffs called two doctors who
each testified positively that it was their opinion that
this occlusion and death resulted from the exertion and
fatigue caused by the work under the circumstances
described just prior to Jones' death. The opposing
evidence was given by a doctor who was given the hypothetical question and answered as follows:
"I can't answer the question yes or no because
I don't think the medical literature from my own
opinion or anybody else's opinion can say dogmatically this is a definite cause, because the
medical literature is full of statements that there
is some relationship between effort and coronary
thrombosis; and the literature is full of statements to the effect that apparently effort has no
relationship to coronary thrombosis. * * * My
own opinion is that it possibly is related in this
particular case, but I don't think you can dogmatically say that it is a cause and effect or it
has no effect."
The evidence was positive on one side and inconclusive on the other, with the result that the Industrial
Commission was bound, so the Court held, to accept
the evidence of the plaintiff.
Likewise, in the case at bar, the evidence produced
on behalf of the plaintiff is clear, direct, positive, and
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unequivocal, while the conclusions of the Panel are
based on misconceptions of law and facts and filled with
speculation and conjecture. The Panel report states
that Daniel Mellen had a severe attack at home prior
to the 23rd day of June, when there is no such fact in
the record. The undisputed evidence in the record shows
that the first time Mellen had any chest pains was in
connection with his work on the roof, and that the pains
came with exertion and left with rest. The only testimony in the record as to an attack at home is the one
testified to by Mellen which occurred after the attack
on the job on June 23, 1965. Dr. Kilpatrick admits
in his testimony that the work activities caused the pain,
and yet he would speculate that the heart attack happened completely as a natural progression of the underlying condition, without the job activities having any
effect at all in aggravating the underlying condition.
The Panel has further disregarded the basic and
fundamental principle stated recently by this Court
in the case of Baker v. Industrial Commission of Utah,
et al., (1965) 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613, which reaffirms the liberal philosophy of the Workmen's Compensation Statutes as follows at page 143:
"In accordance with the purpose of the Industral Compensation Act to alleviate hardships
upon workers and their families, the facts and
inferences therefrom constituting a worker's
right to recover are liberally construed."
The Baker case is also clear authority for reversing
the Industrial Commission in the case at bar. In that
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case the court held that the undisputed evidence could
not be ignored by the Industrial Commission where the
evidence showed that claimant suffered a sudden sharp
pain in her left hip and leg as she stooped over or
raised up in filing papers in a filing cabinet.
The evidence in the case at bar is more compelling
than was the evidence in the Baker and Purity Biscuit
Company cases, where slight physical movement precipitated underlying nondisabling conditions to the
point of disability. The evidence in the case at bar is
undisputed that )'Hellen had no disability prior to the
incidents of June 23 and shortly prior thereto, and that
following these incidents he has received a substantial
disability.
As it has been said, a person starts dying from the
day he is born. Almost any disability a person has in
later life has resulted from an underlying condition
which gradually progresses to the point of disability.
The vVorkmen's Compensation Statutes allow recovery
for a person whose disability has been hastened by the
incidents of his employment. Certainly the undisputed
evidence in the case at bar places this case in such a
category. Who can say that the incidents of Mellen's
work did not precipitate and hasten this heart condition
from which he now suffers? The Medical Panel made
no such statement but speculated that his heart condition inevitably resulted from an underlying and progressing condition.
This case is no different from the Baker and Purit.11
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Biscuit C01npany cases and others, where underlying
conditions have been aggravated and precipitated to
the point of disability or death.

In the spirit of liberality underlying the Workmen's Compensation Statutes, the denial of plaintiff's
claim by the Industrial Commission should be reversed
and his claim granted.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. BLACK
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Appellant
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